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THE BRITISH ACADEMY

THE ANNUAL RALEIGH LECTURE

Endowed by Sir Charles Wakefield, Bart., on the occasion
of the Raleigh Tercentenary, Oct. 29, 1918

1919

World History

By

Viscount Bryce

Fellow of the Academy

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By VISCOUNT BRYCE

FELLOW OF THE ACADEMY

Delivered October 29, 1919

THIS lecture, appointed to be annually delivered on an historical subject, has received the name of Sir Walter Raleigh, having been founded by a munificent donor on the occasion of the commemoration (on October 29, 1918) of the death of the famous Elizabethan. The name is appropriate, for Raleigh besides being a soldier, a sailor, an explorer, a politician, and a courtier, was also an historian, one of those—few in every age—who have made history as well as written history. Belonging to the generation which was adorned by our greatest poet and one of our greatest thinkers, he was typical of it in being a man of imagination as well as of action, in the boldness of his spirit, in the variety of his interests, in the energy with which he threw himself into whatever work his hand found to do. Blameless he was not; but the blameless are seldom the most attractive. Scrupulous he was not, but the word unscrupulous, like its paler sister Opportunism, is used to cover some very different things. The man and his career are fit to be commemorated in the centre of the British dominions as well as in the vast region then known as Virginia, taking its name from his sovereign mistress Elizabeth,¹ where the State of North Carolina has given his name to its capital city, honouring him as the first Englishman to found a settlement in that western continent where now the majority of English-speaking men have found their home.

The subject on which I propose to address you has been suggested by the book which is Raleigh's chief contribution to our literature, his *History of the World*, written in the Tower of London, where he was imprisoned, and published in 1612. Of its substance and style I need say nothing, nor of the impression it produced at the time, for one of our Fellows, the distinguished Regius Professor of Modern

¹ Virginia then meant, according to the first Royal Charter of 1609, the whole coastal region from lat. 34° N. to 45° N., i. e. from Cape Fear to the Bay of Fundy.

History at Oxford, has dealt with it in a learned and instructive paper read to the Academy in 1916. It is of the conception of World History, of the various lines on which it may be treated, of its relation to the histories of particular countries and of the light it may be made to throw upon them, that I shall speak.

The subject seems not unfitted to that strange phase, critical beyond all precedent, through which we, with the other civilized nations, have been passing. For the first time in the annals of our planet its inhabitants have become one whole, a community each and every part of which is affected by the fortunes of every other part. In the War, the embers of which, still glowing in Eastern Europe and Western Asia, we hope to see soon extinguished, fully nine-tenths of the human race, the backward as well as the most advanced peoples, were involved on one side or the other. The flame lit on the Danube and the Rhine spread till it blazed along the coasts of the Atlantic, the Indian, the Pacific, and the Arctic Oceans. There was fighting in China and New Guinea, on the heights of Armenia and in the valley of the Jordan, on the steppes of Siberia and Turkistan. Bolivia broke off relations with Germany, though she had no means of getting at the enemy, and the King of the Tonga Islands thought it necessary to proclaim his neutrality. Many forces, non-political even more than political, forces to which I shall presently advert, had been drawing the nations together. But it was the outbreak of war that first made us realize how mankind had become virtually one community, all the members whereof were to be thereafter linked together. Except as respects the loss of their citizens in war, and the devastation of their territories, some of the neutral nations suffered, and some are indeed still suffering, almost as much as the belligerents. There followed a phenomenon rarely noted before, a formidable rise in prices with a corresponding rise in wages, in every civilized country. The contagion of excitement and of strange doctrines accepted under excitement has spread far and wide. Thus have all men been forced to feel that the parts of the world have grown into one, for weal or for woe: thus comes it that now for the first time the History of the World in the full sense of the word can begin to be written.

It is a curious coincidence that the same generation which has seen World History change itself from a history which traced the course of many rills into a history which sees all these streams united to flow together in one channel, should also see the annals of mankind extended far further back into the past than had ever been dreamed of before. As geology revealed to us the earlier stages of the process by which the solid crust of the earth was formed and moulded, so

archaeological research, unearthing and examining the haunts and dwellings of primaeval man, is enabling us to create a sort of prehistoric history. We now know more than any previous age has known about our most remote ancestors, their physical characteristics, their tools and weapons, their burial customs, their dwellings, and even their first attempts at art. The history of man now begins many thousands of years before authentic records, and gives a fresh interest to the study of those backward branches of the human family which still remain. Something similar may be said of the study of the mythology and folklore of those surviving primitive races, the observation of whose beliefs and customs is enabling us to explain many things that had been obscure in the religious rites and legal observances of the civilized peoples of antiquity. Nor must I forget to add that craniology, and still more the development of comparative philology, have thrown much light on the relations of races to one another in their earlier stages. These additions to our knowledge have, by lengthening the period over which observation extends, enlarged our whole view of history, and made us also feel how comparatively small a part of it is that political history which used to arrogate to itself the whole field.

The idea that history might be so written as to cover much more than the chronicles of one particular country or city, and should include much more than political events, is no new one. It is, indeed, as old as history itself. Herodotus took for his theme the long war between Asia and Europe, a war of which men, as he tells us, found the beginning in the carrying off by the Phoenicians of the mythical Io from Argos, and the carrying off from Sidon of the perhaps equally mythical Europa by the Greeks. He brought his narrative down to the capture of Sestos by the Athenian fleet in 479 B.C. But he did even more than this. The first traveller who united a boundless curiosity to wonderful literary gifts, he gave to posterity a vivid picture of the lands and peoples that lay to the north and to the east and to the south of the Aegean Sea, a picture not only of inestimable value as the foundation of our knowledge of those lands, but of an imaginative charm which none of his successors has surpassed. He is the father of geography as well as of history, for he instinctively felt that they are inseparable. Many followed him in attempting to present a connected view of the main current of events which affected and brought into political contact neighbouring nations. Polybius was one of the first of these, and the most truly scientific in his method. Cornelius Nepos, as we are told by Catullus in the graceful dedication of his poems, had set forth in the form of three sheets or tables the events

of every age.¹ Three centuries later Eusebius prepared what was a more elaborate chronology. But the most remarkable book which surveyed rather than described the course of history as a connected whole, was that which St. Augustine entitled *The City of God*. Desiring to give the Christian people comfort in that terror with which the capture of Rome by Alaric had filled them, he wrote from the standpoint of theology, as had done the author of the Second Chapter² of the Book of Daniel in the outline given of the four great Powers culminating in the rule of Rome, which had dominated the Eastern World. Among the moderns who essayed the same task Raleigh was one of the first, and one of the latest was the illustrious Leopold Ranke who at the age of eighty-five had the courage to begin a *Weltgeschichte* which he carried down to the days of the Emperor Henry IV and nearly the whole of which he dictated, being, from failing eyesight, no longer able to write or to consult the authorities. Most of the books of this class have been narratives, pursuing the course of events first in one country and then in another, without setting forth any more connexion between them than their political relations at some moments involved. There were other writers, however, who approached World History from a different side, treating events as matters to be dealt with not by way of narrative but by the discovery and exposition of general principles or laws running through the course of human things. They used events to illustrate these principles, and thus wove together from the infinite variety of human experience what has been called a Philosophy of History. With these writers the general reflections, laws, and principles were the main substance and texture of the treatise, whereas in the narrative histories it is events that take the foremost place, while philosophical reflections, like those of Thucydides or Gibbon or Niebuhr, are interposed only where there are lessons of special importance to be drawn from the events.

Of those whom we call historical philosophers rather than historians, the first was the Tunisian Arab, Ibn Khaldun, born early in the fourteenth century, a powerful and original thinker and, like Raleigh, a man of action as well as of literary gift, an Odysseus who had 'seen the cities and known the minds of many men'. Of those who have dealt with the subject in modern times the most fruitful was the Italian Giambattista Vico, an elder contemporary of Montesquieu, whose *Esprit des Lois*, like Voltaire's *Essai sur les mœurs des nations*, two epoch-making books, may be referred to the

¹ 'Ausus es unus Italarum
omne ævum tribus explicare chartis.'

² With which compare chapters vii to xii of the same book.

same category. Still later came Hegel's short but striking *Philosophy of History*, well known to you all, a book not always correct in its estimate of facts, but rich in suggestive thought. Between Universal History and the Philosophy of History as they have been in fact treated, no sharp line can be drawn, but we may take the typical form of the one to be a narrative, or group of narratives, and that of the other a disquisition. Thus while the Philosophy of History deals with principles as gathered from facts, a History of the World will devote itself to narrating the facts as they happen, endeavouring to connect those that belong to one country with those which were contemporaneously happening elsewhere. If World History be called the Biography of Mankind, the Philosophy of History will be the Psychology of men as beings naturally and normally social—a psychology, however, grounded on observation not so much of the individual as of men actually seen and studied in their associated activities.

That Unity of History whereon many historians, and in our own time Edward Freeman most insistently, have dwelt, consists not only in the connexion of Events in an unbroken chain of causation from the beginning of things, but also in the permanence of man's tendencies as a social being, so that when we know what man has done we can conjecture what he will be likely to do. Thus can we explain the Present by the Past and the Past by the Present; thus and thus only does any kind of prediction become possible. The causation or relation of events is visible chiefly in following the annals of any single country, though as each country more or less affects every other, that which counted for much in one may count for something in others also. Tendencies inherent in man's nature are potent everywhere, irrespective of Time as well as of Space.

There is another way of trying to present the History of Mankind as a whole which escapes some of the difficulties incident to the plan of a number of distinct narratives dealing with different countries. It is to adopt what may be called a cultural instead of a geographical scheme. Select certain main lines of human activity more or less present in every nation, and let the description and elucidation of what is contemporaneously accomplished by each nation follow these lines, so that the progress made, or decline suffered, along each line shall be treated as one whole. As these activities are developed in all, or nearly all, civilized as well as semi-civilized peoples, their efforts along each line have a kind of unity which tends to become a practical, if unconscious, co-operation. Thus the progress of man may be traced by taking not the nation but the cultural effort and achievement of mankind, in various nations and along various paths of progress,

as the thread on which to string the record, and so we shall have a history of commerce, of science, and man's growing mastery over natural forces, of religion, of geographical exploration, of inventions and the practical arts of life, of poetry, of metaphysical philosophy, of morality in theory and practice, of music, of the fine arts, of politics, and of law. To bring all these lines of activity together would be to present a connected view of what mankind has done or failed to do. The special gifts or defects of each people will be brought into the same picture. The tendencies which draw them together, or keep them apart, will become more manifest. While some ambitious spirits have essayed (though with scant success) a complete history of civilization which must include many of the lines of progress just enumerated, the most learned of modern Englishmen preferred to take the Idea of Liberty and its gradual development as the central line. Said Lord Acton, 'We have no thread through the enormous intricacy of modern politics except the idea of progress towards more perfect and assured progress and the Divine right of free men.' Another such main thread running through the ages might be found in economic change and the relations of classes to one another.

It is sometimes asked why no satisfactory History of the World has yet been written. Why should we not have within a moderate compass something better than a string of arid and often obscure formulas, contributing little to the real interpretation of facts, or than sketchy generalizations which in emphasizing one set of phenomena mislead us by the omission of others, something which shall present a connected view of the whole life of the race, a Biography of Mankind in the form of a concise narrative of events with illuminative comments upon them? If such a thing can be done, why has it not been done? The answer seems to be that there have been very few persons possessing both the requisite learning and the amplitude of vision and the delicacy of insight sufficient to qualify them even to contemplate so great an undertaking, and that those few have declined it because they realized its magnitude. To set forth in their respective proportions the main events and the critical turning-points in the progress of the ages needs not only vast erudition but an exceptionally sound judgement. Still the thing can be done. To describe the external causes and processes by which material civilization has advanced, such as scientific discovery, useful inventions, the growth of industry and commerce,—this also is possible for a writer of high selective skill and the faculty of condensation. But the really interesting and essential thing, the vital part of history, is to enter into and trace the changes that have passed upon the human mind. Who is there that has, so

to speak, soaked himself in the literature, and the religion, and the artistically creative quality of the ancient world, and of the mediaeval world, and of the Renaissance world, and of the last three centuries, till he feels that, comprehending each of these epochs, he can faithfully describe the phases through which the thought and the emotions and the beliefs of mankind, or even of the great western peoples only, have been passing?

But instead of inviting you to saunter through a boundless field of speculation as to how a complete History of the World may be written, let me suggest one special and definite line which a narrative might follow. This line, suggested by that unification of mankind of which I have already spoken, would be an account of the Process and the Forces whereby races, tribes, nations, and states have been, or are being, drawn together into one common life commensurate with the earth which they inhabit. We see the Process almost complete. We have better materials than had our predecessors for examining the causes and forces that had brought it to the point where, in 1914, we suddenly saw the already commingling fluids crystallize at the passage of the electric current of war. Let us glance at three epochs in the annals of mankind to note the nature of the Process before we consider the Forces.

In what is called the prehistoric age, when the lamp of archaeology sheds a glimmering light on the rude progenitors of mankind, revealing widely scattered small and weak groups painfully defending themselves against wild beasts and the rigours of nature, an age before the tillage of the soil or even the domestication of animals had begun, population was sparse and the relations of one human group to another were slight. Though some racial stocks and groups were taller and stronger than others, and some had a gift for art denied to their fellows, there is reason to think that most of them stood on much the same level of culture, using, at least in the same latitudes, like clothing, like food, like weapons. It was not intercourse and imitation that produced this similarity, but rather the fact that the primal needs of all were few, and the satisfaction of those needs had to be sought by the same simple means. As we see when to-day we examine the savage races that still remain, a struggling life, and especially a wandering life, does not admit of much difference in comfort between one group and another. It would seem, therefore, that notwithstanding physical differences, the external conditions under which men lived, their habits and their ideas, were much the same everywhere in the early palaeolithic age, and the relations of tribe to tribe chiefly those of desultory warfare. Into the question of whether the whole human race has or has not sprung from a single root I do not enter, since it seems to be a

matter of controversy among the anthropologists, and some at least of those who hold that there was more than one line of passage from the anthropoids to man believe that one of the types died out, and is not represented in any variety of modern man.

When after descending through an interval of time, whose length, differing in different countries, is everywhere unconjecturable, we approach that dawn of more or less authentic history, which is marked by the earliest monuments and records of China, Egypt, and Assyria, and which begins in Greece with the Homeric poems and the legends of race migrations, the scene has been amazingly changed. Some nations have invented writing, have formed a mythology with personal deities, have erected temples, raised armies, built populous cities fed by the labour of many tillers of the soil, and have in some cases so developed language as to make it a means of literary expression. The sea is traversed by ships: the *Odyssey* shows us commerce and piracy flourishing side by side. Meanwhile, other nations live by hunting, or are pastoral nomads, while others in the far north and in the tropics have made no advance from primitive savagery. Compare the Atarantes of Libya, as to whom Herodotus¹ could learn nothing except that they had no individual names and cursed the sun when he scorched them, with the thriving cities of Crete separated from Libya by a narrow sea. A still greater change has been the formation of permanent and well-defined racial groups, each with a set of those distinctive emotional and mental qualities which make up what we call a national character. The sharpest distinction is between the Greeks and their so-called barbarian neighbours, but among the barbarians there are many grades of civilization. How such racial groups—some of them nations, some rather what we should call nationalities—were evolved out of the apparently similar human raw material, so to speak, of those primæval savages whom archaeology showed us in the palæolithic ages, is an obscure and fascinating problem not likely to be ever solved. Physical environment goes only a certain way towards the solution, for we find striking disparities between different race groups which were, so far as we know, formed under like conditions of soil and climate. The Celts, the Slavs, the Teutons seem to have all dwelt together in north temperate regions where the conditions of life were broadly similar, yet they had become unlike one another when still uncivilized or scarcely semi-civilized. Such at least is what we gather from the descriptions of ancient writers from the time of Herodotus (who, of course, does not classify races as we should) down to Procopius. Language, it

¹ Book IV, ch. 184.

must be admitted, is not always a safe guide, for there have been cases in which a people having its own language adopts (as did the Bulgarians) another language, yet retains its physical and mental characteristics. In the case, however, of the three great branches aforesaid of the Indo-European stock, well-defined intellectual qualities coincide with the linguistic divisions. Passing by this question, let us note that the advance from savagery to civilization has been in the main a process of Divergence. The similarity, which archaeological research enables us to assume seven or eight thousand years (or perhaps more) before our era, has been replaced by a general dissimilarity which Chinese and Egyptian records enables us to date for those countries as far back as about 4000 B.C. For those round the Aegean Sea we may put it at 2000 to 1500 B.C., in Italy at 800 or 900 B.C., in Western Europe at 700 A.D., in Siberia at 1600 A.D., and at 1700 A.D. in the Pacific Islands—these being, roughly speaking, the epochs at which the curtain rises in each of those regions. Meanwhile, the population of the world has been growing. Insignificant in palaeolithic times, it was, by the fifth century B.C., in such countries as Mesopotamia, China, and the valley of the Ganges, to be counted by millions, perhaps by many millions. There are no data for a calculation.

Besides the process of divergence which produced definite types there must have been a destruction or absorption of weaker and smaller tribes by the larger and stronger. That absorption, as well as the increased production of food, created the larger groups which survived while the others perished. The two processes of extinction and the formation of divergent types, coincided with a closer contact of the larger groups due both to the growth of population and to the development of modes of transport by land and sea. The stronger groups traded with one another, learnt from one another, stimulated one another, but they did not necessarily grow more like: the tendency often was for each to develop a more marked individuality.

Now observe another process in which, while the differentiation of types continues, there is a convergence of interests, a closer contact of groups and a greater reciprocal influence exercised by each group upon the other. Let us take a stride of twenty-four centuries from the days of Herodotus to our own, and see what changes have passed on the earth.

Despite the wars and pestilences which contact has brought, population has trebled or quadrupled, or perhaps quintupled, and most rapidly in the last two centuries. Europe, which in the fifth century B.C. we may roughly guess to have had from twenty to thirty millions of inhabitants, has now more than 400 millions, and though

parts of Asia and Africa have been depopulated by Moorish or Turkish misrule,¹ and many millions perish now and then in Chinese rebellions, India has never suffered so little from war or famine as since the establishment of British rule, though the growth of population makes famines still formidable. Many small races and peoples have vanished and comparatively few national types remain. Languages are more numerous than are such types, but languages, too, are disappearing fast. Fifty-five nations followed Xerxes in his expedition against Greece, but there are now only seven in what was then the Persian Empire. Fifty or sixty languages—possibly more—must have been then spoken along the coasts of the Mediterranean and the Euxine. There are now between twelve and fifteen.² Or to take examples nearer home, there remain out of the numerous Celtic linguistic groups—Manx is virtually extinct—only three, of the Slavonic languages about six, of the Teutonic—and the descriptions of Procopius imply a good many—only six.³ When Herodotus settled at Thurii in Italy, ten languages at least were spoken there and in Sicily. There is now only one language (though of course many dialects) and one people. The reduction in the number of races, nationalities, and languages has been accompanied not only by an increase of population, but by a convergence in forms of civilization and a drawing of groups together for the purposes both of politics and of commerce. Tribes and peoples which in the earlier days had dwelt apart as small units have been gathered into larger units, and these latter are standing in closer touch with one another. The change is fourfold. It is from small units to large units, from isolation to connexion, from disparate towards similar conditions of life and thought including that mastery over the forces of nature which science has bestowed. And with this we find also an accentuation of national types and national self-consciousness. There has been assimilation in everything except in relative material strength and in national character. The general result has been that while the differentiation of type continues in the various sections of mankind, mankind as a whole becomes unified and its interests converge.

Among the forces and influences which have worked together to produce these changes, three may be singled out as supremely active.

¹ Tunisia and Algeria are remarkable instances. In the ten mile radius from the ruins of the Great Amphitheatre at El Djem (the ancient Thysdrus) in Tunisia, built to hold sixty thousand persons, there are to-day less than six thousand.

² It is not easy to say, especially as regards the Black Sea coasts, what is to be called a Language, and what a Dialect.

³ Modern Norse and Danish are virtually the same, and the Taal of South Africa can hardly be reckoned a language.

Of these three Conquest was the first at work. There was always fighting since man began to be man. The earliest authentic records of the Egyptian and Assyrian kings show how often these two great Powers attacked one another through Syria, the one narrow passage between the watery wastes to the west and the arid wastes to the east. Both Powers were subjugating minor states, as did also the Hittites in Eastern Asia Minor and the Lydian kings in Western. This process went on incessantly thereafter, the larger nations extending their territory, sometimes destroying, sometimes merely reducing to subjection and incorporating, the smaller peoples, while gradually substituting their own civilizations. When the European Powers began to plant colonies, as did the Spaniards, Portuguese, English, Dutch, and French, the range of conquest, widened by the extinction of the small units, advanced more swiftly. Four great epochs stand out in this process. To the first belong the conquests of Alexander and Hellenization of the East which followed; to the second, the conquests of Rome, which imposed one law and administration and the use of two official languages, one or other of which presently became general, each over a vast area. The third saw the discovery and occupation of the Western Hemisphere beginning from 1492, and the fourth the partition of Africa in 1890 between four leading European Powers. But a like process had gone on more slowly in Europe itself, though not always by war. From the tenth century onwards the Germans were Teutonizing the Slavs south of the Baltic. Somewhat later the Russians absorbed and Slavonized many Finnish tribes, and in the seventeenth century acquired most of Siberia almost without a blow. The Archdukes of Austria obtained by marriage, but their German subjects could not assimilate, provinces inhabited by Czechs, Poles, Slovenes, Croats, Slovaks, Ruthenes, and Rumans. England conquered Wales and established herself in Ireland, Giraldus Cambrensis remarking at the time that there was an ancient prophecy that the island would not be conquered till just before the Day of Judgement. England was herself ultimately peacefully annexed by Scotland.¹

Commerce was from the first a constant means of enabling peoples to know and influence one another. It began with the Phoenicians, already everywhere on the sea in the Homeric age. The Greek cities followed and planted their trading stations all the way from Trebizond to Marseilles. Here, too, four epochs stand out—the conquests of Alexander which opened the East, the suppression of Mediterranean

¹ Had Philip II of Spain had the good sense to spend at least part of the year in Lisbon, as James VI forsook Edinburgh for London, the Spanish Crown need not have lost Portugal.

piracy by Pompey, the discovery of America and of the Cape route to the Far East, and the use of steam for navigation. Manifold are the ways in which commerce has acted. It has carried diseases among uncivilized races which proved unable to resist them, it has taught aboriginal peoples new ways of life, new kinds of houses and clothing, under which they often wither and die, it has removed the basis of their social order and the beliefs of primitive life—often without supplying a substitute—it has introduced slavery and the consequences that followed slavery into lands that knew it not, and it has poured vast swarms of immigrants into new countries, sometimes to the injury of the institutions there existing.

Religion began to work as a unifying force so soon as any worship or belief was preached irrespective of a particular spot or people. The oldest worships were local; even the propitiation of ancestral ghosts was associated with local shrines. No religion was exclusive or claimed to be universal. The first body of doctrines and precepts that, being fit for every man, were universal and, therefore, propagandist, was that derived from the life and teaching of Sakya Muni. Buddhism swept over Eastern Asia, took many forms among many peoples, underwent in most of them corruptions which brought it a long way back towards idolatry, and in one country became a ruling hierarchy. The religion of Israel as a pure and lofty monotheism was making its way in the Roman world before our era, witness the half-jesting remark made by his friend Fuscus to Horace in one of the latter's Satires. But the supremely important moment was that at which the apostles (St. Peter first, with St. Paul and others taking up the work and carrying it further) turned to the Gentiles. The power of Religion as a unifying—and also often a severing—force is stronger than any other, for it grows from the deepest roots of human life, and can prevail against every other emotion, creating a bond firmer than that of race or national loyalty, triumphing over self-interest and the fear of death. If, therefore, any one stream of narrative history had to be selected as the central stream since the days of Tiberius, Ecclesiastical History is to be preferred.

Six centuries after the spread of Christianity came the spread of Islam, marking a third great epoch and supplying a new force to permeate the peoples, binding those who embraced it into one vast community irrespective of race or language, and aiming, though unsuccessfully, at the creation of political union. It did for the mediaeval and modern world of North and Central Africa, as well as for half Asia, what Christianity had done for Europe in the work of assimilation, and went even further in the effacement of distinctions of race and rank. All these things are so familiar to you, that I mention them

only to compare their respective spheres of influence, for while Conquest and Commerce worked upon externals, Religion worked on the mind and heart.

A new force which might, if brought into effective play, profoundly modify the relations of peoples to one another, ought not to pass unnoticed, for it is a movement of world significance. It is the attempt to efface national distinctions altogether by uniting into one body all over the world that which is the largest section of each nation. The hand-workers, or so-called 'proletariate', are summoned in every country to extinguish all other classes and become first a dominant, and then the only, element, other classes having been brought to the same level and forced to become also hand-workers. Were this scheme carried out, the proletariat everywhere would be regarded as one world community organized primarily for the production of commodities. In respect of its annihilation of national divisions, this scheme would resemble the action of Islam, which substitutes a religious bond of union for a national one; but the unifying force would be not spiritual or emotional but economic or occupational, based on the principle that Capital is the common enemy and absolute economic equality the common aim. This doctrine of the Class War, first launched some sixty years ago, proved not strong enough to prevent its adherents in Germany and France from each supporting their own Government in 1914. But it is passionately held by many and its propaganda may spread far. No more need be said of it here. A prairie fire is a grand sight, but best viewed from a distance.

Of the other unifying forces, such as those of philosophy, beginning from Thales, of literature, of Physical Science (including inventions which have given us power over nature) from the discovery of the use of fire down to telegraphy and air ships and the internal combustion engine, multiplying mankind by increasing the production of food and aiding commerce by improving modes of transportation—of these and other forces it is needless here to speak. But if any one were asked to mention a very few names as representative of the various unifying influences, whom could he single out as those whose life work has done most to bring mankind together? Perhaps he would select, among conquerors, Alexander and Julius Caesar, among religious teachers, Buddha, St. Paul, and Mohammed; among explorers, Columbus and the even more venturesome Magellan; among men of science, Watt, to whom rather than to any other single man we owe our modern means of communication, and Pasteur, whose researches have so reduced the risks of zymotic disease that white men can now with reasonable safety live among and civilize and



convert, or oppress and exploit, men of other colours in every part of the globe.

Let us pass from the Forces which have made for the aggregation of races and peoples into large units or have given them ties of union, to consider the processes whereby these changes have advanced. Three such may be named. The smaller units have been either extinguished or absorbed or assimilated. A vast number of tribes and even some nations have been exterminated, some by war, as befell the Ostrogoths in their long conflict with Justinian in Italy, others by famine or disease. The Tasmanian aborigines died out fifty years ago, the Onos of Tierra del Fuego are perishing now at the hands of the sheep farmers. The last deliberate attempt at the extermination of a nation was made in 1915, when the Turkish Government destroyed one half or more of the Armenians.

Absorption takes place when two races dwelling on the same ground melt by degrees into one another, the language, customs, and perhaps the religion also of the stronger or more numerous prevailing. Assimilation describes the process when, though there is not a blending, the peoples finding themselves in contact come to adopt the same ideas and form of speech and ways of life, as the three races of Great Britain have now been almost wholly assimilated, whereas the Danes and Normans of earlier days were absorbed. In this instance a new national type which we call British, though it is predominantly English, has been formed without the complete disappearance of the original Brythonic, Gaelic, and Anglian types. In all such cases the chief factors that make for fusion and internal unity are a common religion and intermarriage, the former being a condition obviously favouring the latter. Difference of religion, which keeps Muslims and Christians, and, in some countries, Roman Catholics and Protestants apart, is however usually a less formidable obstacle than difference of colour, especially where the African races are concerned. To determine the results of intermarriage between different races is one of the most interesting and also one of the most obscure questions World History has to deal with. So much, however, is clear, that as between some races, such as Celtic and Teutonic, Teutonic and Slavonic, the mixed stock is fully equal to either of the pure stocks. This is said to be the case also as respects the Mongolian races and the American aborigines, the latter being probably of East Asiatic stock. So far as a limited observation in Spanish America enables me to judge the Mestizo (half-breed) race there is not markedly inferior to the pure white, and not very markedly superior (apart, of course, from education) to the aboriginal. But the admixture of white with

negro blood gives less satisfactory results, and the mixture of the native American races with the negro is universally condemned. The consequences to be expected from these intermixtures are a matter of immense significance for the future.

You may naturally ask, after noting how many of the old types of humanity have been and are still disappearing, whether new national types are not springing up to replace them by some such process of differentiation through admixture as we may conjecture to have created the vast number of tribal and national types known to the ancient world. Some such did arise from time to time, as the Swiss people was formed out of Allemanic Germans, Celts, and Burgundians (now French speaking), and as the Low Germans of the Lower Rhine regions became the Dutch, but those within the field of authentic history are few, and I need advert to two epochs only, at each of which several may be observed. One is that of the great Migration of the Peoples (what German writers call the *Völkerwanderung*), those Southward and Westward movements of the Northern and West Asiatic peoples which began with the Angle and Saxon invasions of Britain in the fifth century A. D., and practically ended with the Magyar settlement in Hungary in the ninth. The Teutonic, Slavonic, and Turkic or Finnic peoples which then entered the Roman dominions, formed, by their intermingling with the subject populations, new nations, such as the English and French, the Spaniards and Portuguese, the Serbs and the Bulgarians. The other epoch began with the occupation of Central and South America by Spanish and Portuguese colonists in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and here we find light on processes continuing down to our time. Very many aboriginal tribes were destroyed by the conquerors, and in the dominions of Spain there grew up a population which gradually drew off from the mother country and was more or less altered by admixture with the surviving native Indians, who were in the uncivilized districts brought to a nominal Christianity. Till independence was achieved a century ago there were no marked differences between the upper classes, i. e. the Spanish element and the educated mestizos (persons of mixed blood) all over the various administrative divisions of this vast area. But in the century since Independence three causes of change have been at work. There has been more intermingling of Spanish and native blood, so the difference between the native population of Mexico, for instance, and that of Peru or of Chile, have tended to differentiate the educated class in each country, and to differentiate both from the regions in which (as in Argentina) hardly any native blood flows in the veins of the colonists. While the

tropical colonies South and West of the Caribbean Sea have made little economic or political progress, the three temperate States of South America,—Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay,—have developed a common civic and industrial life, which in affecting their habits has modified their character. And lastly, the improved political conditions, military tyrannies having been in the temperate States superseded by governments more or less truly popular, added to a growing population, wealth, and power, have induced a strong national self-consciousness. Thus Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are now nations distinct from one another and still more unlike the tropical countries. Nearly as much may be said of Peru, Bolivia, and Cuba; and Mexico seemed to be approaching a sort of nationhood just at the moment when it lost the strong hand of Porfirio Diaz.

The causes which produce new nations are so interesting, and so likely to act but seldom in the future, that it is worth while to ask whether we may expect in the Self-Governing Dominions of Britain phenomena analogous to those noted in Spanish America.

In South Africa the fusion which may be expected, after a few generations, of the Dutch and British elements, two cognate stocks with the same religion, will probably create a nation not quite the same as either of its two component parts. In Canada something similar might happen if intermarriage between the French speakers and the English speakers were to become common—a thing at present unlikely. But the British part of the Canadian people—and this applies also to Australians and New Zealanders, though an observant eye discovers in them some divergences from the English of Britain, these are almost entirely due to the circumstances of colonial life. They are still practically British in all essentials, differing from the normal English type rather less than it differs from the inhabitants of Scotland or Ireland. It is not self-government, not even independence, that is the chief factor in the creation of national types. Not so much independence as the concurrence of other causes has differentiated that branch of the British people which occupies New England from that which has remained in Old England.

Having referred to one process which is going on under our eyes, let me mention others now in progress which illustrate what I have described as happening in earlier ages. There are still at least five regions in which small groups that had remained unchanged while they dwelt apart are now disappearing under the influence of their more civilized neighbours. The wilder parts of India are full of Hill Tribes, small aboriginal units, some of them, like the Todas of the Nilghiri Mountains, counting only a few hundred souls. A century

ago there were more of these tribes, and they were larger. A century from now many of them will have vanished, and they will be smaller, for they are melting away, first from natural causes, but chiefly by the passing over of their members either to Islam or to some form of Hinduism. When so absorbed their distinctive characteristics begin to fade and eventually disappear. In Siberia the nomad or half-nomad races of the icy north are being slowly Russianized, as they are brought, nominally at least, within the pale of the Orthodox Church. Among the Yakuts a father, instead of having to pay a baptismal fee, is paid a rouble or two for every child which he brings to the font, and as the same child is apt to be brought a second or third time, after a decent interval, the practice conduces to infant welfare, exposing the child to no such dangers as are said to haunt the burial clubs of more civilized countries. In Central Africa it is Islam that proselytizes, with remarkable success, and on the whole to the benefit of the converts. The control of the Senussi is said to be now acknowledged by about twenty millions, nearly all of whom are negroes, for the desert tribes such as the Tuareks are few in numbers. But the most impenetrable refuge of primitive savagery is found in the vast and gloomy forests of the Amazon river and its tributaries. Here a multitude of tribes, some of them even smaller than the Hill Tribes of India, yet many of these with a language of their own, remain under conditions that have not changed for many ages, living off wild fruits and the fish which they kill with their arrows. Some are being exterminated by the ruffians, mostly half-breeds from Peru, more cruel than alligators or jaguars, who enslave them as rubber gatherers. But in the unexplored recesses of this wilderness some tiny groups may long survive, for the restless energy of tropical nature makes agricultural, or even forestal, exploitation too costly to be profitable. The isles of the Pacific show other phases of contact. In New Zealand the Maories, whose chivalric spirit and splendid valour won the respect of the British settlers, died off fast during the last two generations, but seem to be now maintaining their numbers. They are already assimilated to the whites in ideas and in their manner of life, and will before long be insensibly absorbed, as is happening to the Red Indians of North America, a good many thousands of whom remain in Oklahoma and other parts of the Far West. Of the smaller islands of the Pacific, some, like the Marquesas, have been almost depopulated by diseases caught from trading ships. Into others there have come the bustling, hard-working Chinamen, from whose intermarriage with the native women there is springing up a mixed people with a type more Chinese than Polynesian. As the

aborigines of such isles as Tahiti and Samoa are the most attractive of all semi-civilized races, one cannot but regret their probable disappearance, though the new stock may prove more vigorous. One feels in visiting these spots on which Nature has bestowed an incomparable charm, and in marking the quick intelligence of the people, how different might have been the past of such a race had not its lot been cast in the midst of a huge and silent ocean, cut off from all share in the great movements of the world. May not the study of World History have suffered not only from the too facile assumption of a so-called 'natural superiority' of some few among the white races to all others, but also from the laying of undue stress upon the conditions of physical environment? Fully admitting the immense part which the climate, flora, and fauna of every country have played in the progress of its inhabitants, weight must also be assigned to the presence or absence of contact with other peoples. In old Peru, and even more in old Mexico, the observer perceives the beginnings of a civilization, which, unpropitious as were some of the physical conditions, had made and was making remarkable progress, when the Spanish conquerors descended upon it like a whirlwind. Had these peoples and those of Mexico in particular, a race of marked intelligence, enjoyed the advantage of such contact as the peoples of the Mediterranean had with one another, each capable of teaching something to the others, and of learning something from them, mankind might have been enriched by the emergence of additional types of civilization. This thesis might, did time permit, be illustrated from the records of the progress made in earlier days by China and the two countries which learnt art and morals from it, Korea and Japan. A traveller who moves among what are called the Backward or semi-civilized peoples, inclines to believe that we Europeans tend to underrate the natural intelligence of these peoples, or (which perhaps is a better way of putting it) to overrate our own. The only people that ever had a right to think itself superior to its neighbours were the ancient Hellenes in the days of their independence. Our European stock, enjoying many inherited advantages, has so far distanced all others in the race. But the race will be a long one, and some of them may yet overtake us.

Let me sum up the results of this hasty survey of the phenomena shown by the contact of human groups, tribes and nations, in the Past in order to see what light can be cast on the Future.

Prehistoric History probably began with a large number of small groups, isolated, but in the main homogeneous in their ideas and ways of life. Contact by degrees increased. Some groups grew large and

became nations and advanced in culture ; others were left behind or died out. In the dawn of authentic history there were already great nations dominating others and thus forming large aggregates, these tending to become homogeneous within, heterogeneous towards those without. From this time onward we note two Processes, Convergence in some things, Divergence in others. Convergence appears in the increasing participation in a material civilization, which the more advanced groups, and especially the larger, enjoy in common. Such a material civilization includes the inventions which spread from one to another, modes of food production, architecture and all that makes for comfort or luxury, methods of war and navigation. To a less extent there grew up a community of ideas, religious or philosophical, for these also spread, and at a later stage, when Asiatics and Italians began to learn Greek, while Greeks and even Orientals began to learn Latin, the influence of literature created mental approximation. A second kind of Convergence was seen in the enlarging concern which each group was forced to take in the affairs of other groups. Trade created international relation. So did political alliances, or the fear of attack, or the lust of conquest. None could be indifferent to the others. But along with these two lines of Convergence, or movement towards uniformity, in material things, there was also a Divergence in types of character and intellect, and in the activities which spring therefrom. Some nations, possessing more force or adaptability, ran ahead of others, and acquired a self-conscious individuality which, if encouraged by material strength and prosperity, was intensified into national vanity or pride. Thus the general outcome of the inter-relations of human groups to one another, from the days when Assyria and Egypt strove for mastery down to 1914, may be described as a reduction in the number of human types, coupled with an accentuation of each type, for the unification of the whole was and is not incompatible with an antagonism of the parts. There is Attraction and there is Repulsion. Closer contact need not involve fuller sympathy. It is not altogether true that reciprocal knowledge makes for the friendship of nations any more than for that of individuals.

The influence of Religion, which was for many centuries the strongest factor, shows the same double quality. It unites and it severs. Christianity and Islam have each brought together many peoples by extending through them the same beliefs and worship. But those who were not brought together were separated more sharply : and its dissociative force was seen in the bitterness of subsequent divisions within the religions themselves.

When we turn to the Future, we ask whether the same tendencies

which have been at work in the past are likely to continue equally active. There could be no warning more emphatic than that which the last seven years have given against prophecies in politics. Who then dreamt that an international war would give birth to a Class War. But the tendencies we have been tracing are due to such far-reaching and continuously acting causes as to have a wider scope and a deeper significance. They rise above the sphere in which the wills of individual men, or even of nations, are the ruling factors. They belong to the category of tendencies permanently operative, almost as certain as are the forces of nature. They are not likely to be materially affected by anything less than some discovery which should revolutionize science, and thereby profoundly affect human nature. One may, therefore, venture to indicate conjecturally some results likely to follow from the tendencies aforesaid should they continue to work for furthering or delaying the unification of Mankind. Of political results I say nothing, for history gives no ground for believing that any form of government, however generally accepted in any particular era, has a promise of permanence. It is eminently subject to the law of universal change. As Heracitus said, one cannot step twice into the same river. The thing that was is not—the thing that is shall not be. Great states may dissolve and be replaced by small states; Democracy may have its day and pass. Nothing permanent except Human Nature, and even in it time may bring changes.

As Science will evidently continue to advance, food production will be increased, and the average life of man be possibly further extended by discoveries in medicine and surgery. Population may, therefore, be expected to grow, unless, indeed, the causes which have led to its decline among the richer class in countries such as Eastern North America and Australia, should spread through the whole community.

The progress of science may, by increasing the quantity of commodities available, be expected to diffuse the comforts of life more widely. The number of languages spoken over the world will tend to decrease as the smaller tribal and national groups are absorbed; and as commerce expands. Already some old tongue dies every year or two. A few centuries hence ten languages may be spoken by more than nineteen-twentieths of mankind—English, Russian, Arabic, Chinese, Spanish, German, Japanese, French, Italian, and Hindustani. Among these English already leads as the language of commerce. Though some of the minor tongues will, no doubt, continue to be used for literary purposes, the spread of ideas arising in any one country through the general use of one or more of the great languages will do much to create a common stock of knowledge and thought through-

out the world. Will this mean uniformity, and will uniformity mean monotony in thought and in art? This is a point on which we are all equally competent or incompetent to speculate each for himself, since here the experience of the past throws only a faint and fitful light down the dim vista of the future. So far, variety has not been wanting. Some have sighed for a world in which there were less of its extremer manifestations. But man will, after a while, begin to feel, as does whoever crosses the Pacific Ocean for the third time, that his planet is a very small one. As respects its surface, the pleasures of geographical exploration have nearly gone, and those of research in the fields of natural history—rocks, plants, and animals—will in a measurable time be exhausted. But the coming generations which have not known these pleasures will not miss them. When we try to fancy what the world will be like at a time lying as far before us as the first appearance of man on the planet lies behind us, the wings of imagination droop as an aeroplane might fall when it had soared into the thin atmosphere a dozen miles above the earth. We have no ladder wherewith to scale the *flammanitia moenia mundi* of which Lucretius speaks. We cannot pass the 'flaming bounds of Place and Time'. Many ancient thinkers, unable to conceive of endless change, fell back on the hypothesis of successive cycles of life, each ending with a cataclysm from which a new cycle begins, exactly reproducing the former, and all being alike bound on the eternally revolving wheel of necessity. This idea, possibly suggested by the yearly return of the constellations to the same place in the sky, is familiar to us from that strange little poem, Virgil's Fourth *Eclogue*. It relieves the mind from the effort of trying to imagine an unending process of incessant change, but it leaves unsolved the problem of that eternity itself whereof the cycles are only a part.

The small and backward tribes will die out or be effaced. Perhaps even some of the smaller nations will be absorbed by their neighbours, as Russia was trying to absorb Finns, Letts, and Lithuanians. When different races dwell together on the same ground, intermarriage will induce a general intermixture, and the two will be blent. This process, however, otherwise inevitable, may be checked by antagonisms of religion or of colour. The differences which divide Christians may become less acute, but if this comes to pass as regards those which divide Islam from other faiths, the process will take longer. Antagonisms of colour, specially marked in Teutonic nations, are as strong to-day in the United States and in South Africa as they have ever been, and may in both countries be a source of grave trouble. No remedy is in sight. It may be conjectured that the constant increase

of a mixed population—for though intermarriage may be forbidden by law, the growth of such a population cannot be arrested—will ultimately, perhaps after some centuries, become an element so large that the colour line can no longer be maintained. Something like this has happened in Cuba and Brazil, and to a less extent in Jamaica. As respects tropical South America, where the population of mixed blood is already larger than the Spanish element, there will be ultimately a complete fusion of the native and the European stocks. Nor need that be regretted, for the European strain will probably tend to prevail and determine the quality of the emergent type.¹

The future of Religion is more obscure, because some of the factors, such as the movements of opinion, are unpredictable. The idolatrous or fetichistic worships of backward peoples, will, before long, expire, except, of course, in the form of superstitions, for superstitions are the oldest of all human things and the most tenacious of life. The three great world faiths seem likely to last as long as we can foresee, while Hinduism (essentially Indian) may continue to lose at the hands both of Christianity and of Islam. Buddhism counts far more adherents, but seems to be less firmly rooted in China, Japan, and Korea than it formerly was.

I have indicated only a few out of the many questions which arise when we try to use the lessons of World History for a forecast of the coming years. How long will last the intellectual primacy which the European races have held for twenty-five centuries? May not the future lie not with the most gifted peoples but with the most prolific? Is there such a thing as the intellectual exhaustion of a nation or even of a race? Is Liberty, in whose progress Acton saw the progress of mankind, really advancing, and is it loved with the fervour of last century? Liberty is the very thing which some among the latest prophets of a new and better world seek to destroy, for they would force every man to the work which the ruling community may prescribe.

Most comprehensive of all is the question—what has World History to tell us about human progress? Does the experience of the Past encourage belief in a brighter Future? To see what this question means let us distinguish the different senses in which men talk of Progress.

¹ It seems possible that a like superior force present in the race which has attained a higher brain and nerve development may operate where intermarriage goes on for a long period between white and black races to make the white type tend to prevail in the mixed race. But there seem to be no data on the subject. The late Mr. Francis Galton, who had studied the problem, told me he knew of none.

In two of these the question can be answered affirmatively, *i. e.* hopefully. In a third it must be answered in the negative. The fourth is that on which the data collected during thousands of years speak with a more doubtful voice.

Taking Progress to mean all that concerns the material side of life—health, comfort, a wide variety of pleasures and larger opportunities for enjoying them, the reply is plain. All these things have been gained by man in ampler measure. Interruptions there have been, but each loss has been repaired, and the latest epochs have been the most conspicuously fertile.

If Progress means a fuller knowledge and a more effective mastery of the forces of Nature, with the invention of more perfect methods and instruments for continually enlarging that knowledge and mastery, here again the advance has been enormous. Mankind's stock of knowledge accumulates even faster than its stock of wealth; and it is more easily accessible to all.

If, however, Progress means an improvement in the intellectual quality of the individual man, *i. e.* either of the leading and dominating minds, or of the average minds, if it imports either a more vigorous power of practical thinking or a finer power of poetical or philosophical or artistic creation, the answer must be that history records no such improvement. Great painters are no more frequent than they were in the fifteenth century A. D., great thinkers than they were in the fifth century B. C., great poets than in the remote age from which descend the Homeric poems, or than that in which an abounding imagination gave us the Elizabethan drama. The sciences of Nature have been advancing swiftly and steadily for more than three centuries, but this advance has been due to the combined labours of an immense number of capable, industrious, and highly trained men, each of whom profits by the work of his predecessors. The great creative spirits, men like Archimedes and Newton, the men of wide vision and profound discernment, appear from time to time, but hardly more frequently than they did in the past. The Temple of Knowledge rises rapidly, but it rises by the co-operative toil of an increasing number of trained workers who cut, raise, and lay the stones better than men knew how to do some centuries ago. But the architects who can design a noble building, and the artists who can decorate it with inventive grace are as rare as ever. Population has enormously increased, but there is no average of genius to population, nor has any one explained the causes which make it more abundant in some epochs than in others.

There remains a fourth sense in which we talk of Progress. The

Moral Progress of a community, be it a nation, or a group of nations, or the world, means a rise in the average level of thinking, of judging, and, above all, of conduct. It means a more diffused and more authoritative standard of justice, honour, good faith, truthfulness, kindliness, compassion, sympathy—of all that used to be called Virtue. Has this standard been rising, either in the most advanced and civilized peoples, or over the world at large? Seven years ago most of us would have answered this question with a cheerful affirmative. Human nature seemed to have shed some of its faults; the poison of what theologians call Original Sin was being gradually eliminated from the system. But we have received bad shocks. Unexpected things have happened, and are still happening, and they throw light upon other things that had been happening before, whose significance was then imperfectly realized. The complacent optimism of the last century has been shaken. As one of our straightest and clearest thinkers recently observed: 'Since this War the Old Enemy of Mankind will not be able to sham dead for a good while to come.' The persistent optimist replies—nobody has any use for an optimist who is not persistent—that the indignation which acts of faithlessness or cruelty arouse is stronger than it would have been two or three centuries ago, and that public opinion promises to become healthier and more sensitive to wrong the larger is the number among and by whom it is formed. Allowing some weight to these arguments, it is nevertheless true that things have latterly been occurring in times of peace as well as in times of war, and in not in a few countries, which show that the lava is still hot under the crust of our commonly accepted social and international morality, and that the fires deep beneath may again burst forth. If we look back to the ancient world, or to the mediæval world, or even to the sixteenth century, there have been palpable gains in various branches of moral conduct, and in the quality of moral sentiment. If we take a long account, carrying it over some twenty centuries, the balance will be in our favour, and we may possibly be now only passing through the trough of what meteorologists call a transitory depression. But many histories of the world will have been written before a more positive answer can be given to the question than we venture on to-day.

A test is now being applied to the nations that may help to show how far the love of justice and peace has penetrated their souls. Is the contact of Peoples and States to be hereafter chiefly, as in the past, a contact of mutual suspicions, liable to lead up to war, or a contact of goodwill, striving to preserve peace? Having seen what evil passions war lets loose, as well as what havoc it works, are the nations prepared to sacrifice some of their self-regarding schemes, and tame

some of their angry passions for the good of mankind as a whole? Does the sense that Mankind has at last become a Community move them to feel the dignity of a common citizenship and the call of a common duty? This is what we are, not, perhaps, confidently, yet hopefully, watching to see. Whither is the bark steering that carries Man and his fortunes? You remember Arthur Clough's lines:

Where lies the land to which the ship would go?
Far, far ahead is all the sailors know.
And where the land she travels from? Away,
Far, far behind is all that they can say.

Is the bark to beat for ever along a rocky coast, where surging breakers threaten shipwreck, or will it reach at last some quiet haven, such as that in which the Ancient Mariner found rest after his wanderings, a haven where the lighthouse and the church looked down on shining waters as the ship drew softly to the shore?



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